I. Introduction
In 2005, Sui and others proposed an improved authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol [1] for wireless mobile communications. Their scheme provided perfect forward secrecy but was vulnerable to an offline password attack [2] . To enhance the security, Lu and others proposed an enhanced AKA protocol for wireless mobile communications in 2007 [2] . Later, Chang and others [3] pointed out that the Lu and others' scheme cannot resist the parallel guessing attack. Chang and others [3] proposed an improved protocol. However, Lo and others [4] demonstrated that Chang and others' protocol does not offer the mutual authentication property. Lo and others also proposed an improved scheme using elliptic curve 
II. Review of Lo and Others' Scheme
For convenience, the abbreviations and notations used in this letter are shown in Table 1 .
The detailed steps of Lo and others' protocol are described as follows.
Step 1. Alice (A) picks a random number
where t is an integer that is predetermined by the corresponding password and P is a point in the elliptic curve. Then, A sends its identity A and Q A to Bob 
III. Weakness in Lo and Others' Protocol
An offline password guessing attack succeeds when there is information in communications that can be used to verify the correctness of the guessed passwords. Lo and others claimed that their protocol can resist offline password guessing attacks. However, in this section, we will show that the offline password guessing attack, contrary to their claim, is still effective in Lo and others' protocol. Our attack consists of two phases.
First phase.
1) The adversary A generates a random number 1) The adversary A guesses a password S' from D and derives the corresponding t'. From the above description, we know the adversary can get the correct password. Therefore, Lo and others' scheme is vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack.
IV. Countermeasure
In Lo and others' scheme, the session key is simply a linear combination of d A P, d B P, and tP. The adversary can deduce the session key upon identifying two out of the three values correlating to d A , d B , and t. Then, having guessed what the password might be, the adversary can verify whether or not the guess is correct. To withstand such an attack, we introduce another point, Q on E, to introduce complexity to the relationships in the session key.
First, the system selects a random point Q on E. However, Q is an important parameter and should be chosen carefully to ensure that it is computationally difficult for an adversary to find the discrete logarithm of Q with P as the base. Otherwise, the protocol will be insecure.
Step Step 4. When B receives the message, it checks the equality of ( || ) With this modification, the improved protocol can withstand the offline password guessing attack described in section III. The reason is described as follows.
The adversary A generates a random number 
V. Conclusion
In this letter, we reviewed Lo and others' protocol [4] and showed that their protocol cannot resist an offline password guessing attack. We then demonstrated how to fix the protocol to ensure that it is robust against attacks.
